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JUVENILE DETENTION: PROTECTION,
PREVENTION OR PUNISHMENT?
ELYCE ZENOFF FERSTER,* EDITH NASH SNETHEN,*
AND THOMAS F. COURTLESS***
S/ORE than 400,000 juveniles, approximately two-thirds of all those
apprehended by the police, were placed in jails or detention homes in
1965.' This high rate of detention is contrary to the articulated philosophy
of the juvenile court that usually a juvenile is to be released to his parents
to await court action. It is also considerably in excess of the National
Council on Crime and Delinquency (NCCD) recommendation that the
detention rate "should not normally exceed ten per cent of the total
number of juvenile offenders apprehended .... ,2 In fact, no supporters
of a high detention rate are found in the literature.' Instead, one finds
not only complaints about the detention rate but also objections to almost
every aspect of juvenile detention.
The following statement, made forty years ago, is similar to comments
made today:
From the data here submitted it becomes evident that children are still commonly
detained in jails all over the country; that there is an absence of adequate facilities
for detention in many jurisdictions; that detention homes are sometimes little better
than jails; that all too commonly, policies of intake and discharge of children are
inadequate; that the wrong kind of children are detained; that children are confined
for too long periods; in short, that which is technically known among social workers
as "good casework standards" are too often lacking in the treatment of these
children.
4
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Washington University, The '-National Law Center.
** Research Attorney, The Juvenile Offender and the Law Project.
*** Professor of Law & Sociology, Co-Director, Juvenile Offender and the Law Project.
Dr. Courtless analyzed all the statistical material and prepared all the appendices for this
article.
1. National Council on Crime and Delinquency [hereinafter cited as NCCD], Juvenile
Detention, in Correction in the United States, 13 Crime and Delinq. 11, 15 (1967) [herein-
after cited as Juvenile Detention]; President's Comm'n on Law Enforcement and the
Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime 37
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Juv. Delinq. and Youth Crime].
2. NCCD, Standards and Guides for the Detention of Children and Youth IS (2d ed.
1961) [hereinafter cited as Detention Standards].
3. See D. Freed & P. Wald, Bail in the United States: 1964 (1964); S. Norman &
A. Barstis, The Controlled Use of Detention (1963); Dorsen & Rezneck, In re Gault and
the Future of juvenile Law, 1 Fain. L.Q., No. 4, at 1 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Dorsen
& Rezneck]; Downey, State Responsibility for Child Detention Facilities, 14 Juv. CL
Judges J., No. 4, at 3 (1964).
4. Detention Standards, supra note 2, at -xi.
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The marked difference between juvenile detention practice and policy for
so many years raises some serious questions: Is a high juvenile detention
rate necessary because of the seriousness of the offense and/or the devi-
ancy of the offender? Or are the practices simply a result of society's
failure to implement a non-punitive system of juvenile justice? Is deten-
tion another example of juveniles receiving "the worst of both possible
worlds"? In other words, is it detention policy or practice which needs
to change?
This article, the second in a series' reporting the findings of a three-
year study on "The Juvenile Offender and the Law," attempts to an-
swer these questions.' It is based on an analysis of statutes and cases,
a review of the literature including statistical and field reports, and a
field study of "Affluent County"7 conducted by the Juvenile Offender
and the Law Project (hereinafter called the Juvenile Study).
I. DETENTION
Detention is usually defined as "the temporary care of children who
require secure custody of their own or the community's protection in
physically restricting facilities pending court disposition. ' 8
Unfortunately, detention statistics, like statistics on arrests of juve-
niles, are both difficult to obtain and difficult to interpret.9 Twenty-
two jurisdictions do not keep any detention statistics at all."° Of the
5. The first article dealt with juvenile arrest, search and seizure, fingerprinting and police
records. See Ferster & Courtless, The Beginning of Juvenile Justice, Police Practices, and the
Juvenile Offender, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 567 (1969).
6. The study was financed by Public Health Service Grant MH-14500 from the National
Institute of Mental Health.
7. Affluent County has the highest median family income of any county in the United
States. An estimate for 1968 indicates that 34,000 families earned between $10,000 and
$15,000 with an additional 47,600 families with incomes between $15,000 and $25,000 and
18,000 families earning over $25,000. These three groups of families comprised 78% of all
families in the county. Department of Community Development, Population and Social
Characteristics 2, 3 (1968).
8. W. Sheridan, Standards for Juvenile and Family Courts 23 (U.S. Children's Bur. Pub.
No. 437, 1966) [hereinafter cited as Children's Bureau Standards]. Similar definitions are
used by the NCCD in its Detention Standards, supra note 2, and Guides for the Detention
of Children and Youth (1961) and the nine states which explicitly define the term by statute.
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22-1-3(12) (Supp. 1967); Idaho Code Ann. § 16-1802 (1969); I1.
Ann. Stat. ch. 37, § 701-9 (Smith-Hurd 1969); Iowa Code Ann. § 232.2(6) (1969); Md. Ann.
Code art. 26, § 70-1(m) (Supp. 1969); Miss. Code Ann. § 7187-02(l) (Supp. 1968); S.D.
Comp. Laws Ann. § 26-8-1(7) (Supp. 1969); Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-64(5) (Supp. 1969);
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 632(5) (Supp. 1969).
9. Ferster & Courtless, supra note 5, at 569-73.
10. Juvenile Detention, supra note 1, at 33.
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twenty-nine that do, most of the statistics are so incomplete" that it is
almost impossible to assemble comparable statistical information on such
items as rate of detention, length of detention, and disposition of juveniles
after detention.
In spite of these difficulties enough information on detention rates has
been obtained to show that there is a very large variation in the use of
detention from one jurisdiction to another. For example, a recent study of
detention in eleven counties in California showed that the detention rates
among the counties ranged from 19% to 667.12 Substantial variations in
detention rates have also been found by other studies."a Since there is
little comparative detention information available, The Juvenile Study
obtained detention information from ten communities. The Study in-
dicated a considerable variation in detention rates from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction.14 Although it might be thought that this variation is due to a
difference in the number of serious offenses under the various penal stat-
utes, the California study found that this is not so."
The Juvenile Study's analysis of statistics obtained from communities
in eleven states found similar results." As well as a large variation in
detention rates between communities, the Study indicates the highest
detention rates are not always related to the most serious offenses. The
"Affluent County" field study also confirms these results.1
11. Id.
12. NCCD, Locking Them Up: A Study of Initial Juvenile Detention Decisions in Selected
California Counties 118 (1968) [hereinafter cited as California Study]. The study analyzed
detention practices in 11 California counties.
13. D. Freed & P. Wald, supra note 3, at 97. "In some places, all children referred to juve-
nile court are detained. In others, only two or three out of every 100 are held. A 50% ratio
is not uncommon ... ." See also Juvenile Detention, supra note 1, at 31; California Study
at 120-21.
14. See App. A. The project wrote to detention facilities serving ten of the largest cities
in the U.S. requesting detention statistics: Atlanta (Fulton County), Baltimore, Boston,
Chicago (Cook County), District of Columbia, Los Angeles, New York City, Philadelphia,
St. Louis, and Oklahoma City. Useful statistics were obtained from Baltimore (NCCD
study), Chicago (Police Annual Report), District of Columbia (Receiving Home Annual
Report), Los Angeles County (Probation Department Report), and New York. In addi-
tion Children's Bureau studies of four communities (Volusia County, Florida; Sangamon
County, Illinois; Trumbull County, Ohio; Tarrant County, Texas) were obtained for
contrasting population size and geographical differences.
15. California Study, supra note 12, at 120-21.
16. See App. B.
17. Id.
18. Only 5 (9.95) of the detained juveniles were alleged to have committed dangerous
offenses such as attempted robbery and assault.
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A. Purpose of Detention
Although there is supposedly agreement about which children should
be detained, 9 communities actually use different criteria or different in-
terpretations of the same criteria.2 0 The reasons for detaining a child are
most often described as follows: Children who will run away during the
period the court is studying their case or, children who must be held for
another jurisdiction (e.g. runaways from institutions to which they were
committed by a court) ;21 Children who will commit an offense dangerous
to themselves or the community before court disposition.
1. Runaways
All authorities state that a juvenile should be detained if such action is
necessary to assure his presence in court.22 They differ, however, in how
they determine when a particular child might run away. The NCCD
recommends that a child is to be detained only if it is "almost certain"
that he will run away.23 The child should be a runaway at the time of de-
tention or have some history of absconding to justify detention under this
standard. 24 None of the eight states, however, whose statutes authorize
detention to assure presence in court, use the language recommended by
the NCCD. 21 The wording ranges from authorizing detention if the child
"may abscond ' 26 to requiring a "substantial probability 2 7 that he will not
appear in court. 28
Only one case, People v. Poland,21 deals specifically with the issue. The
detained juvenile was found "in need of supervision" because she violated
19. D. Freed & P. Wald, supra note 3, at 95-96.
20. Id. at 96.
21. Id.
22. NCCD Standard Fam. Ct. Act § 17, Comment (1959); NCCD Standard Juv. Ct. Act
§ 17, Comment (1968); Uniform Juv. Ct. Act § 14; Juv. Delinq. and Youth Crime, supra
note 1, at 37; Detention Standards, supra note 2, at 15; S. Norman & A. Barstis, supra
note 3, at 5; Downey, supra note 3, at 3.
23. Detention Standards, supra note 2, at 15.
24. juvenile Detention, supra note 1, at 29.
25. California, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, New York, North
Dakota.
26. N.D. Cent. Code § 27-20-14 (Supp. 1969).
27. N.Y. Fain. Ct. Act § 739 (1963).
28. In the other six states, four allow detention if the minor is likely to flee the jurisdic-
tion, Cal. Welfare & Inst'ns Code § 628(e) (West Supp. 1969); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 37,
§ 703-6(2) (Smith-Hurd 1969); Md. Ann. Code art. 26, § 70-11(2) (Supp. 1969); Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 43-205.03 (1968); one is restricted to those who have run away, Mich. Stat.
Ann. § 27.3178(598.15)(b) (1962); and the other allows detention if it is "necessary" to
assure court attendance, Miss. Code Ann. § 7187-06 (Supp. 1968).
29. 44 Misc. 2d 968, 255 N.Y.S.2d 455 (1964).
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her probation by late hours, truancy, and difficult behavior at home. She
was placed in detention while the possibility of placement with family
friends was evaluated. In a habeas corpus petition the court held that the
past history of truancy and difficult behavior justified the Family Court's
decision that there was a substantial probability that she would not ap-
pear at the scheduled hearing.30 It is noteworthy that in this jurisdiction
the only other grounds for detention is serious risk that the juvenile will
commit a criminal act. Although it is necessary to know why a child is
detained before high detention rates can be analyzed, most detention
statistics do not report the number of children detained for the various
reasons. In one of the jurisdictions, which does give such information,
35%a1 of the children detained were held because they were "potential
runaways. 3 2 A second study3 showed that 14% of the detained children
were held because they were runaways,' and a third showed that 6%o of
them were detained on that ground3 In "Affluent County," 30%o of the
children detained during the period of the field study had run away from
their homes or institutions. 6
There is even less information about the number of children who do not
appear in court. The one study found which contained information on this
subject said that judges and court personnel in low detention counties
reported that children "rarely" fail to appear in court.37 "Affluent
County" court records also indicate that only a small number of juveniles
failed to appear at their court hearings. 38
30. Id. at 969, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 456.
31. See Marion County, Oregon Juvenile Court Center, Joseph B. Fleton Home, Annual
Report, A Broken Promise 37 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Oregon Study].
32. The applicable statute states that the child shall be released to the custody of his
parents except "[wjhere it appears to the court that the welfare of the child or of others
may be immediately endangered by the release of the child." Ore. Rev. Stat. § 419.573(3) (b)
(Replacement 1967).
33. California Study, supra note 12, at 122.
34. The statute in this jurisdiction authorizes detention if a minor is likely to flee the
jurisdiction of the court. Cal. Welfare & Inst'ns Code § 628(e) (West Supp. 1969). It was
not clear from the study if the children classified as "runaways" included children "likely
to flee" or was limited to those who had already run away from home.
35. See D. Borden, Report of Youth Aid Division 35 (1967) [hereinafter cited as D.C.
Study]. This unpublished 1967 study for the Committee on the Administration of Justice,
analyzed the District of Columbia's policemen of the Juvenile System, the Youth Aid Division.
A11 cases of police detention during one week were studied.
36. Affluent County, supra note 7.
37. Juvenile Detention, supra note 1, at 31. This study of juvenile detention was under-
taken by the NCCD for the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration
of Justice.
38. Affluent County, supra note 7.
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2. Danger to Community
The likelihood that a child's actions will be a danger to the community
is almost as widely accepted a reason for detention actions as doubt about
the child's appearance in court. Virtually all authorities approve of detain-
ing a child because of danger to the community,"0 and twelve states spe-
cifically authorize detention for this reason by statute.40 The danger
referred to is the likelihood of the child's committing new offenses. The
NCCD recommends that only children who are "almost certain" to com-
mit dangerous offenses be detained.41 None of the statutes uses the "al-
most certain" qualification nor do any of them define a dangerous
offense.42
The first problem in interpreting these statutes is deciding what ev-
idence is relevant to a determination that the child will commit another
offense. A 1965 Alabama Work Conference on Juvenile Court Judges sug-
gested that detention is proper when the child's attitude suggests that he
would go home and immediately repeat the offense.43 This criterion places
maximum credence upon the child's appearance of repentance, a highly
subjective factor.44 The Advisory Council of Judges suggests that children
with strained family relationships and serious problems are likely to get
into further trouble and, consequently, should be detained.4r This cri-
39. See Detention Standards, supra note 2, at 15; Children's Bureau Standards, supra
note 8, at 62-63.
40. Alaska Stat. § 47.10.140(a) (1962); Cal. Welfare & Inst'ns Code § 628(d) (West
Supp. 1969) ; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22-2-2 (Supp. 1967) ; Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 37, § 703-6(2)
(Smith-Hurd 1969); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-3212 (Replacement 1956); Md. Ann. Code art. 26,
§ 70-11(a) (1) (Supp. 1969); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27.3178(598.15) (c) (1962); Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 43-205.03 (1968); N.Y. Fain. Ct. Act § 739(b) (1963); N.D. Cent. Code § 27-20-14
(Supp. 1969) ; Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-91(1) (Supp. 1969); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 643(a)
(Supp. 1969). See also Uniform Juv. Ct. Act § 14; Model Rules for Juv. Cts. rule 17,
Comment (1969).
41. Detention Standards, supra note 2, at 15. New York and Michigan isolate the danger
the child presents to the public. Michigan sees it in "those whose offenses are so serious"
whereas New York sees it as a "serious risk that he may do a (criminal) act."
42. The remaining standards are vague. Alaska specifies detention must "be necessary"
to protect the community. Four states require the necessity to be "immediate," "urgent," or
both. See California, Colorado, Illinois, and Nebraska. Maryland and North Dakota allow
detention if "required" to protect the community; Vermont does if "reasonably required."
Indiana permits release "without danger" to the public whereas Utah allows detention unless
"unsafe to the public."
43. D. Ottman, Proceedings of the Ala. Work Conference for Juvenile Court Judges 21
(1965).
44. Adverse police reaction to provocative behavior has long been noted and warned
against. See Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 Minn. L. Rev. 547, 552 (1957).
45. NCCD, Guides for Juv. Ct. Judges 46 (1963).
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tenion seems too vague to be helpful without definition of the terms "prob-
lems" and "strained family relationships."
In some communities, the juvenile who has been apprehended or ad-
judicated in the past, is judged to be likely to commit a new offense. A
recent study found that children who have been detained previously and
those who are on probation are more likely to be detained than those who
have not. 6 Although prior delinquent behavior may seem to be the logical
way to predict future offenses, it has not yet been verified by empirical
data. The one empirical study which attempted to validate this hypothesis
was carried out with adult criminals. It found that neither the seriousness
of the crime charged nor the offender's past record provides a reliable
basis to predict adult pre-trial behavior.47 Unfortunately, there has been
no similar study for juveniles.48
Even assuming the kinds of evidence which will justify a prediction
that a juvenile is "likely" or "almost certain" to commit a dangerous
offense are known, the term "dangerous" still needs to be defined. Deten-
tion statistics from most communities do not contain this information.
However, one study found that if the juvenile was accused of rape, arson,
or an offense with a gun, detention was automatic. Otherwise, the kind of
offense was weighed with his age and the number and recency of prior
police contacts.4 9
Another study said police tend to detain all juveniles who commit
sexual offenses and acts which would be felonies if committed by adults. '
If the investigating officer finds the child to have a "reliable" family, how-
ever, and there is little likelihood that he will not appear in court, there
is less tendency to detain the child. The Juvenile Study collected and
analyzed data on the offenses allegedly committed by detained juveniles in
eleven communities in order to obtain some information on seriousness of
offenses. If "dangerous" is defined as including only offenses against per-
sons, then in only two localities were more than 10%o of the juveniles de-
tained because they were "dangerous.'
46. California Study, supra note 12, at 162.
47. Report of the President's Comm'n on Crime in the District of Columbia, Minority
Views of Patricia M. Wald, 930-36 (1966) [hereinafter cited as the D.C. Crime Commision
Study].
48. Although the Glueck's have done numerous prediction studies of juveniles, they have
not studied the activities of juveniles awaiting adjudication. See, eg., S. & E. Glueck,
Unraveling Juvenile Delinquency (1950).
49. D.C. Study, supra note 35, at 38.
50. U.S. Children's Bureau, A Study of Services for Delinquent Children in Trumbull
County, Ohio, pt. I, at 31 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Trumbull County Study].
51. See App. B.
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An attempt was made to find out the specific offenses with which the
juveniles were charged because "offenses against the person" encompasses
a variety of acts from simple assault to homicide. Unfortunately, the
data were available for only five of the eleven communities. The results"
indicate that under any reasonable definition of "dangerous," danger to
the community is not the reason for holding the majority of the detained
children in any of the five jurisdictions. In fact, if burglary is not included
in the definition "dangerous offense," three-fourths of the detained chil-
dren are held for some reason other than dangerousness.
In addition to authorizing detention for children who will run away
before adjudication and those who will commit an offense dangerous to the
community,53 the NCCD also recommends that children "almost certain to
commit an offense dangerous to themselves" be detained.54 The only
relevant statutory provisions are even more vague than the Council's
statement. Typically they allow detention in order to protect the minor
or the community 5 Unfortunately, defining which acts committed by a
juvenile are sufficiently dangerous to him to justify detention is even more
difficult than defining those acts dangerous to the community.
Certain acts which would seem to fit the definition are specifically
excluded by the Council. Thus, school truancy is not considered a reason
to detain.-6
Girls who stay out late at night and are suspected of being promiscuous
and juveniles who are charged with alcohol and drug offenses are de-
scribed as those who might commit acts dangerous to themselves prior
to adjudication. The question is whether there is sufficient danger that
they will seriously injure themselves to justify detention. The fact that
these children are usually returned to the community even if they are
adjudicated delinquent should be considered in any decision about de-
tention.
Another difficult question is whether juveniles who have been appre-
hended for participation in civil rights protests need detention for their
own protection. A Maryland court answered this question affirmatively.
In Ex Parte Cromwell" the Maryland Court of Appeals justified deten-
tion of two fifteen year old juveniles who had participated in peaceful
52. See App. C.
53. See pp. 164-70.
54. Detention Standards, supra note 2, at 15.
55. Alaska Stat. § 47.10.140(a) (1962); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-3212 (Replacement 1996);
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-205.03 (1968).
56. Detention Standards, supra note 2, at 17. The NCCD takes the position that "[tru-
ancy is a school problem which should be handled in the school system through social
services and special classes or schools when necessary." Id.
57. Ex Parte Cromwell, 232 Md. 305, 192 A.2d 775 (1963).
[Vol. 38
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protests against segregation. The town was under virtual military occupa-
tion at the time and the court thought it would be reasonable to remove
the children "from the scene of danger, where they would be safe from the
physical injuries they might suffer if they remained at home and persisted
in their past course of action."' ' The court also pointed out that the
parents might be unfit because they were either indifferent to the chil-
dren's activities or encouraged them. 0 It is of interest that the court in
a subsequent decision in the same case reversed the adjudication of delin-
quency of these children because their conduct was "not so fundamentally
wrong as to require permanent treatment, as distinguished from tempo-
rary custodial care."6 0
Although the Maryland court believed that detention of juvenile civil
rights demonstrators is for their protection, there are others who think
such detention is frequently used as a punishment. The Civil Rights
Commission reports that many juvenile demonstrators were detained for
long periods of time without bail or hearing.0" A judge in one community
explained that " '[i] f one is bad enough to keep locked up, they're not en-
titled to bail; and if theyre not bad enough, there's no use to make them
make bond.' 1162 In another community, one 14 year old girl demonstrator
was detained in jail for 87 days without a hearing of the charges against
her."3
In contrast with the many states whose statutes state specific reasons
which justify detention, at least ten states merely authorize detention
when release would be "inexpedient," "impracticable" or inadvisable." ''
Although it seems as if any alleged delinquent could be detained under this
language, in Baldwin v. Lewis,65 the court ordered a child released "un-
less there is a finding that because of the circumstances, including the
gravity of the alleged crime, the nature of the juvenile's home life, and
58. Id. at 309, 192 A.2d at 778.
59. Id. at 310, 192 A.2d at 778.
60. In the Matter of Cromwell, 232 Md. 409, 414, 194 A2d 88, 90 (1963).
61. United States Comm'n on Civil Rights, Law Enforcement: A Report on Equal Pro-
tection in the South at 81 (1965). See also Starr, Southern juvenile Courts, A Study of
Irony, Civil Rights, and judicial Practice, 13 Crime and Delinq. 289 (1967).
62. United States Comm'n on Civil Rights, Law Enforcement: A Report on Equal
Protection in the South 81 (1965).
63. Id. at 82.
64. "Inexpedient": Ala. Code tit. 13, § 352(4) (1959). "Impracticable": D.C. Code Ann.
§ 16-2306(a) (1967); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A:4-32 (1952); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.31
(Page 1968); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 14-1-20 (1956). "Impracticable and undesirable": Mo.
Ann. Stat. § 211.141(1) (1962); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.29(1) (1957); "Impracticable or
inadvisable": Nev. Rev. Stat. § 62.170(1) (1967); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 1107(a) (Supp.
1969-70).
65. 300 F. Supp. 1220 (ED. Wis. 1969).
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the juvenile's previous contacts with the court, the parents or guardian of
the juvenile are incapable under the circumstances to care for him."00
B. Children Who Should Not Be Detained
The NCCD and other authorities attempt to describe children who
should not be detained as well as those who need detention. Punishment,
study, investigation, treatment and lack of a suitable home are not valid
reasons for detention according to most authorities. 7 There are several
objections to using detention for punishment." One is that punishment is
the court's function and should be administered only after all the facts are
proven, not as an immediate reaction to the charge. 0 Another reason is
that the child, his parents and the public are led to believe that the
youngster's detention was, in fact, his correctional treatment and that he
will straighten out after "a lecture from the judge and possibly a postcard
type of probation ... 270
Some commentators have pointed out that using detention to punish
can backfire. For example, a "probation officer" placed two boys in de-
tention for a few days because they had numerous referrals for minor
nuisance offenses. They were placed in detention to teach them a lesson.
However, the boys "never had it so good." Apparently the facilities of the
detention home, food, etc. surpassed the boys' own homes.' It is argued
that jail detention would have been no better. Along with shelter and food,
jail would provide the opportunity for "kids [to] exchange delinquency
experiences with the big shots.172 Further since the detention gets the
juvenile out of school and allows him to "read comics," it often is an
ineffective deterrent.73
Unfortunately, various studies show that detention is sometimes used
to punish a child. For example, in certain Massachusetts counties, proba-
tion officers felt that giving the child a "taste of confinement could serve
as a deterrent to further delinquency. 71 4 Similarly, a Texas county study
66. Id. at 1233.
67. Juvenile Detention, supra note 1, at 17; accord, NCCD, Guides for Juv. Ct. Judges,
supra note 45, at 45: "[Ilt is not proper to deprive the child of his liberty before his case
has been heard in court ...21
68. S. Norman & A. Barstis, supra note 3, at 14-15. In contrast see L. Lobel and M. Wylie,
Juvenile Delinqency Can Be Stopped (1967) for an espousal of punitive detention.
69. S. Norman & A. Barstis, supra note 3, at 16.
70. Juvenile Detention, supra note 1, at 36.
71. S. Norman & A. Barstis, supra note 3, at 14.
72. Id. at 14-15.
73. Note, The Juvenile Offender, Some Problems and Possible Solutions, 53 Ky. L.J. 781,
782 (1965). However, the author favors punitive detention for weekends.
74. U.S. Children's Bureau, A Study of the Division of Youth Service and Youth Service
[Vol. 38
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revealed that 39% of detainees were released after 3 to 4 days. Explain-
ing this pattern, a probation officer stated that after these children spent
a few days in jail, they didn't need anything more in the way of service
from the court.75
The use of detention for punishment is not confined to probation offi-
cers. A recent law review article points out that when a juvenile hearing
is continued in one Kentucky county, the juvenile is detained in the jail
or detention home.70 The article states that the "purpose of holding him
over is. .. to teach him a lesson, or to show him what it is like in jail."'
Detention for purposes of punishment may also exist in communities
where it is not so openly acknowledged. For example, The President's
Task Force on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime sees reason for
inquiry when many cases in which detention was used are later dismissed
without petition. 8 Such detention would breach the Children's Bureau
Standards, which require a petition for a detained child to be filed."
Detention of children solely for police or social investigation when they
do not otherwise require secure custody is also condemned. 0 It is felt that
detention ought not to be corrupted into a "convenience" either for social
workers or the policemen. Nevertheless, children are detained for these
reasons.
81
Similarly, most authorities do not condone detention for diagnostic
studies or for treatment if the child has not been adjudicated delinquent.8 2
Despite the prevailing opinion of authorities, some jurisdictions still
detain children solely to study them. For example, Massachusetts allows
detention for diagnostic study, 3 but the detention home, if at workload
Board Commonwealth of Massachusetts, pt. III, at 27 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Massachu-
setts Study].
75. U.S. Children's Bureau, A Report of a Five Day Study of Services to Delinquent
Children in Tarrent County, Texas, pt. II, at 17 (1967) (hereinafter cited as Texas Study].
76. Note, supra note 73, at 782.
77. Id.
78. Juv. Delinq. and Youth Crime, supra note 1, at 36.
79. Children's Bureau Standards, supra note 8, at 61. NCCD Standards also require a
petition to be filed. Detention Standards, supra note 2, at 21.
80. Detention Standards, supra note 2, at 16.
81. D. Freed & P. Wald, supra note 3, at 100.
82. Detention Standards, supra note 2, at 17; D. Freed & P. Wald, supra note 3, at 99.
Children's Bureau Standards, supra note 8, at 62. Judges in Affluent County use community
rather than detention facilities for this purpose whenever possible. One judge said he would
prefer to send many more juveniles to community facilities rather than the state's 30-day
diagnostic centers. The problem is the shortage of community facilities. Although it may
seem obvious to the reader that it would be less expensive for the state to provide more
out-patient facilities then to house and feed the juveniles for 30 days, unfortunately, this
solution has not been adopted by many legislatures.
83. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 119, § 68(a) (1965). See also Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 712A.15
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capacity, may refuse to admit a child for that purpose. 84 One study found
that detention for one or two months without adjudication, purely for
studying a child, is not uncommon in Rhode Island.",
One suggestion is to use community based facilities for children who
need study but not detention. If the child in detention needs these services
he can be taken to them.80
Although an effort was made to distinguish juvenile and adult detention
on the grounds that the former constitutes "treatment," this reasoning
has been discredited as "semantic acrobatics. '8 7 Not only is "treatment"
premature but the detention period is usually too limited in time for any
effective treatment.88 In fact, treatment has been rejected as a proper aim
or function of a pre-hearing detention.
Some probation departments and law enforcement agencies defend their detention
practices on the grounds that detention is of therapeutic value to the child. Others
frankly admit that children are detained because of the convenience in conducting
investigations and administering psychological examinations. While detention may
have a therapeutic effect in selected cases, in the Commission's view, it is neither the
function of law enforcement agencies nor probation departments to use it for this
purpose. In our opinion, this is clearly and unmistakably a judicial responsibility
which must be arrived at after juvenile court jurisdiction has been established.8 9
The child who does not need secure custody but who cannot be left
with his family poses the most difficult problem in the area of detention.
For example, in one year more than 4,000 neglected and dependent
children were incarcerated in the Cook County detention facility. 0 All
authorities agree that dependent and neglected children do not need secure
(d) (1968) which permits detention of children "for observation, study and treatment by
qualified experts."
84. Massachusetts Study, supra note 74, at 39.
85. Dyson & Dyson, Family Courts in the United States (pt. 3), 9 J. Fam. L. 1, 19 (1969),
citing Legislative Report on the Family Court of the State of Rhode Island, Fifth Annual
Rep. 19 (1967) (274 children detained for study at R.I. Training School, Child Welfare
Services, Ladd School of Rhode Island Medical Center, "without wayward or delinquent
adjudication.")
86. Detention Standards, supra note 2, at 16-17.
87. D. Freed & P. Wald, supra note 3, at 95.
88. See NCCD, Guides for Juv. Ct. Judges, supra note 45, at 45-46 which accepts the
estimates of one week to ten days for detention in a good facility. The Council suggests that
the judge insure review by limiting the legal operation of a detention order to 7 days.
89. In re Macidon, 49 Cal. Rptr. 861, 867 (1966) (quoting Report of the Governor's
Special Comm'n on Juv. Justice, pt. 1, at 42 (1960) (emphasis deleted).
90. NCCD, The Cook County Family (Juvenile) Court and Arthur J. Audy Home: An
Appraisal and Recommendations for the Citizens Committee on the Family Court 198 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as Cook County Study]. See also NCCD, Guides for Juv. Ct. Judges,
supra note 45, at 42.
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custody, but need "shelter care,""1 i.e., "temporary care of children in
physically unrestricting facilities, usually pending return to their own
homes ... ,92
The Uniform Act, 3 the Model Rules, 4 and at least nine states now
have statutory provisions for shelter care.9 5 Nevertheless, many neglected
and dependent children in these jurisdictions probably will be held in
detention rather than shelter facilities because sufficient shelter facilities
are not available. It is the lack of shelter facilities, not the lack of a
statutory definition, which caused their detention in the past. In fact, five
of these statutes do not limit the placement of neglected and dependent
children to shelter facilities."0
The use of shelter care for some delinquents has also been suggested. T
Some suggest that juveniles who are charged with status offenses may not
need secure custody.9 Others approve of shelter care for children charged
with law violations.99 The reasoning is that the child does not need secure
custody, but must be removed from home because of strained parent-child
relationships or because the parents are unable or unwilling to supervise
him.100
Before "shelter care" is adopted as a panacea for any detention prob-
lems more thought needs to be given to both the purpose and the imple-
mentation of shelter care laws. If one of the purposes is to keep neglected
and dependent children out of detention facilities, the law should spe-
cifically state that these children may not be placed in detention facil-
91. Detention Standards, supra note 2, at 2, 8.
92. Id. at 2.
93. Uniform Juv. Ct. Act §§ 2(6), 14.
94. Model Rules for Juv. Ct. rules 1.5, 12-18 (1969).
95. E.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-226(c) (Supp. 1969); Cal. Welfare & Inst'ns Code
§ 506 (West 1966); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22-2-3(1) (Supp. 1967); Hawaii Rev. Stat.
§ 571-33 (1968); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 37, § 703-3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969); Md. Ann. Code
art. 26, §§ 70-11, 70-12 (Supp. 1969); N.D. Cent. Code § 27-20-16(4) (Supp. 1969); Ore.
Rev. Stat. § 419-575(1) (Replacement 1968); Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-91(1) (Supp. 1969).
All references to statutes in this section are to the above provisions.
96. Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Oregon, Utah.
97. Detention Standards, supra note 2, at 2; D. Freed & P. Wald, supra note 3, at 109.
98. Jordan, The Responsibility of the Superintendent to Maintain the Function of Deten-
tion, 19 Juv. CL Judges J. 50 (1968).
99. See Eaton, Detention Facilities in Non-Metropolitan Counties, 17 Juv. CL Judges J.
9 (1966). The question of close custody is not determined "solely on the basis of the gravity
of the misconduct charged. A self-confident runaway who sees no reason why he should not
keep going may be more of a security risk than a juvenile burglar who, when apprehended,
reverts to the status of a frightened and homesick small boy." Id. at 11-12.
100. NCCD, Guides for Juv. Ct. Judges, supra note 45, at 47-48. Some communities have
successfully operated a variety of shelter facilities for these children. See L. Goter, R. Hamm
& M. Osterberg, A Home Away From Home: Community Volunteers Empty the Jail (1968).
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ities. 101 It must be remembered, however, that the presence of these
children in detention facilities is due to the lack of shelter facilities. If the
state is not yet willing to provide shelter facilities, a shelter care law is
meaningless. This is precisely the situation in Oregon, where there is a
statutory provision for shelter care "for those not needing secure cus-
tody," but no adequate shelter care facilities in any county in the state.10
Another problem concerns the extent of the use of shelter facilities by
delinquents. Are they to be used by all status offenders or only some of
them? If some status offenders or some law violators should be placed in
shelter facilities, what criteria are to be used in making the determination
between shelter and detention care?
There are many questions about detention that need to be answered
before informed decisions may be made about shelter care. For example,
does a child's past truancy coupled with current allegation of truancy prove
that his parents are unwilling or unable to control him? To what extent
are children now detained because parents are considered unwilling or
unable to supervise them? In how many cases are these terms being used
as synonyms for parental neglect? Is it possible that in some cases delin-
quency petitions are being filed where neglect petition would be more
appropriate?' Is the wrong petition being filed because delinquency and
neglect are confused or is it because it is easier to obtain an adjudication
of delinquency than neglect?
There is no doubt that provisions for "shelter care" are in keeping with
the juvenile court philosophy. But if there is a failure to clarify its pur-
pose and to implement it, the literature for the next forty years is likely
to contain articles trying to prove that either the policy or the procedures
are incorrect.
II. DETENTION PROCEDURES
To find out who is making detention decisions which do not conform to
juvenile court philosophy and why they are doing so, the procedures for
these decisions must be examined. Detention decisions are made at three
101. E.g., Arizona, California, and Maryland. North Dakota prohibits mixing allegedly
delinquent with allegedly unruly children. Maryland will do so after January 1, 1972, to
allow for construction of adequate facilities. New York does not allow any detention of
children alleged to be persons in need of supervision. "There is no such urgency" warrant-
ing taking a child into custody on the ground he appears to be a person in need of super-
vision. New York Fam. Ct. Act § 721, Committee Comment (1963).
102. Comment, In re Gault: Juvenile Justice-A Proposal for Reform, 47 Ore. L. Rev.
166, 174 (1968).
103. See N.Y. Fain. Ct. Act § 739, Committee Comment (1963). "If the court is con-
cerned that the respondent will not have a suitable place to stay until the return date, It
should consider whether a neglect petition should be filed." Id.
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different levels by people with different professional backgrounds and
duties.
A. Police
The initial decision to detain or release a juvenile is made by the
police.114 The police can: (1) release; (2) release accompanied by an offi-
cial report describing the encounter with the juvenile; (3) officially "rep-
rimand" with release to parent or guardian; (4) refer to other agencies
when it is believed that some rehabilitative program should be set up
after more investigation; (5) supervise when it is felt that an officer and
parent can assist a child cooperatively; (6) refer to the juvenile court
without detention; and, (7) refer to the juvenile court with detention.0'°
Most statutory references to the police suggest a preference for release.
A typical provision directs the officer to release the child to the custody
of his parents or other responsible adult upon his promise to return the
child to court for a hearing."0 6 However, the policeman's duty to release
is far from mandatory. The statutes often provide that he need not release
the juvenile if such action would be "undesirable,' 10 7 "impracticable," '
104. Juvenile Detention, supra note 1, at 29.
105. Piliavin & Briar, Police Encounters with Juveniles, 70 Am. J. SocioL 206, 203 (1964).
106. See Cal. Welfare & Inst'ns Code § 626(b) (West 1966) which allows release without
a promise; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22-2-3(4) (Supp. 1967); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 975(a)
(1) (Supp. 1968); D.C. Code Encyc. Ann. § 16-2306(a) (1966); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.03(2)
(1961); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 571-31 (1968); Idaho Code Ann. § 16-1811.1(c) (Supp. 1969);
Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-3212 (Supp. 1968); Iowa Code Ann. § 232.16 (1969); Ky. Rev. Stat.
§ 208.110(3) (1962); Aid. Ann. Code art. 26, § 70-10(a) (Supp. 1969); Mass. Ann. Laws
Ann. ch. 119, § 67 (1965); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 712A.14 (1968); Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 260.171(1) (Supp. 1969); Miss. Code Ann. § 7187-06 (Supp. 1968); Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 211.141(1) (1959); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 62.170 (1967); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 10-603.1
(2) (Supp. 1969); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:4-32 (1952); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 13-8-42 (1953);
N.Y. Fain. Ct. Act § 724(b) (i) (Supp. 1969); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 110-27 (1966); ND. Cent.
Code § 27-20-15(1)(a) (Supp. 1969); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.31 (Page 1965); P.R.
Laws Ann. tit. 34, App. I, Rule 3.2 (Supp. 1968); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-1095.17(a) (Supp.
1968); S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 26-8-39 (1967); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 2338-1, § 11
(1964); Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-90 (Supp. 1969); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-102(b) (19S7).
See also Uniform Juv. Ct. Act § 15(a) (1); NCCD Standard Faro. CL Act § 16 (1959) and
NCCD Standard Juv. Ct. Act § 16 (1968), which allow the officer to request a wrtten
promise if he thinks it desirable. Some statutes direct that the officer "in determining which
disposition of the minor he will make . . . shall prefer the alternative which least restricts
the minor's freedom and movement." See Cal. Welfare & Inst'ns Code § 626(b) (West 1966)
and Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-205.02(3) (1968). References to statutory provisions in this sec-
tion are, unless otherwise indicated, to the above provisions.
107. See Missouri.
108. See the District of Columbia, Florida, Indiana, Missouri, Nevada, and New Jersey.
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or not in the best interests of the child or community. 0 9 Only a few
statutes, such as Georgia's, express a preference for detaining rather than
releasing a juvenile." 0
Despite this statutory preference for release, police often detain rather
than release a child. A 1964 study reported that although detention rates
vary widely, it was not uncommon for over 50% of children referred to
court to be detained."' Recent studies show similar results. For example,
one study of several counties revealed that 66% of those referred to court
were detained," -2 while a study of a community in another state showed a
detention rate of 62%. 113
Most jurisdictions have some statutory limitations on police detention.
The most severe one is a requirement that the police take the child before
a juvenile court "immediately," forthwith, or "without delay.""' 4
In jurisdictions with these statutory limitations, the police do not have
the authority to detain, but can only recommend detention to the judge
or the probation officer. In practice, however, the police make detention
decisions even in these jurisdictions. For example, in California, a juris-
diction with this limitation on police detention, a recent study of several
counties showed that "police officers make the initial detention decision
with the endorsement of both the judge and the probation department.""'
Equally startling to the study team was "police belief that law enforce-
ment agencies are responsible for, and in fact, [are] determining local
detention policies. If police respondents perceived this issue correctly,
then law enforcement agencies are doing the work of the courts and proba-
tion departments.""'
Despite the fact that California police do not have the power to detain,
the statutory procedure "has not been sufficient to relieve California of
the ignoble distinction of having one of the highest detention rates in the
country."" 7 The reasons for the high detention rate and perhaps the
prominent police involvement in them are described in a recent article.
109. See Idaho, Minnesota, South Dakota, Utah and Virginia.
110. Ga. Code Ann. § 24-2416 (Supp. 1968): "It shall be the [duty] of the officer taking
the juvenile offender into custody to place him in such detention home .... "
111. For release and detention figures taken from Detroit, Indianapolis, San Diego and
Washington D.C. police reports, see D. Freed & P. Wald, supra note 3, at 97.
112. California Study, supra note 12, at 66.
113. Seattle Police Department, Annual Report for 1967 at 24.
114. See California, Florida, and Vermont, Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 640 (Supp. 1969).
115. California Study, supra note 12, at 40.
116. Id. at 62.
117. Boches, Juvenile Justice In California: A Re-Evaluation, 19 Hastings LJ. 47, 73
(1967).
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Most minors are arrested at night or on the weekends. The Attorney General has
ruled that the obligation to immediately investigate is satisfied if the probation officer
begins the investigation at 8 a.m. on the next judicial day....
The probation officer can detain the minor for 48 hours, non judicial days ex-
cepted, without filing a petition, and the detention hearing is not held until the
following day. As a practical matter this may stretch the period of detention to 6
days.118
Other statutory schemes for limiting police authorized detention, such
as requiring a court order for detention,"' notifying the judge or intake
that a juvenile is in detention, 120 filing of a petition alleging delinquency
within a specified time, 12 ' and/or requiring court review of the decision
118. Id. at 73-74.
119. See pp. 180-86 infra on Judicial Review. Those jurisdictions requiring a court order
or authorization for detention are: Alabama, Ala. Code tit. 13, § 352(4) (1958); Con-
necticut, Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 17-63 (1960); District of Columbia, D.C. Code Encycl.
Ann. § 16-2306(b) (1967); Florida, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.03(3) (1961); Georgia, Ga. Code
Ann. § 24-2416 (Supp. 1968); Idaho, Idaho Code Ann. § 16-1811(4) (Supp. 1969); Iowa,
Iowa Code Ann. § 232.17 (1969); Kentucky, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 208.110(4) (1962); Mliis-
sippi, Miss. Code Ann. § 7187-06 (Supp. 1968); Missouri, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 211.141(2)
(1959); Nebraska, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43.206.04 (1968) ; New Mexico, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 13-
8-43(2) (Replacement 1968); Oregon, Ore. Rev. Stat. § 419.577(3) (1968); Pennsylvania,
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 11, § 248 (1965); Puerto Rico, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 34, § 2007(b) (Supp.
1968); South Carolina, S.C. Code Ann. § 15-1095.17(b) (Supp. 1968); Vermont, Vt. Stat.
Ann. tit. 33, § 641(a) (Supp. 1969); Washington, Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 13.04.053 (Supp.
1968); Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. § 48.29 (1963); NCCD Standard Fain. Ct. Act § 17(1) (1959);
NCCD Standard Juv. Ct. Act § 17(1) (1968). All references to detention statutes in this
section are to the statutory provisions cited in this footnote.
120. See Alaska Stat. § 47.10.140(b) (1962); D.C. Code Encycl. Ann. § 16-2306(a)
(1966) ; Fla. Stat. Ann. § 39.03 (1961); Haw-aii Rev. Stat. § 571-32 (1968) ; Ioma Code Ann.
§ 232.17 (1969); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 119, § 67 (1965); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 260.171(2) (Supp.
1969); Miss. Code Ann. § 7187-06 (Supp. 1968); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 10-603.1(4)
(Supp. 1969); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 62.170(1) (1967); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 169:6 (Replace-
ment 1964); Nj. Rev. Stat. § 2A:4-32 (1952); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 13-S-43 (Replacement
1968); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 419.577(i)(b) (1968); RI. Gen. Laws Ann. § 14-1-20 (1956);
S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 26-8-19.4 (Supp. 1969); Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-90 (Supp. 1969);
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 13.04.120 (1962); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-102 (1957)
121. Within 48 hours excluding non-court days see Cal. Welf. & Inst'ns Code § 631 (West
1966) ; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22-2-3(3) (Supp. 1967); Iowa Code Ann. § 232.17 (1969);
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-205.04 (1968); S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 26-8-23.1 (Supp. 1969).
Within 24 hours see Idaho Code Ann. § 16-1811(4) (Supp. 1969). Within 72 hours see
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 13.04.053 (Supp. 1968). The Uniform Juv. Ct. Act § 17(b) merely
requires the petition to be made "promptly." The typical period is 48 hours excluding the
non-court days, long enough to allow short-term punitive detention. The success of this
limitation has been noted in one city where the court requires a petition to be filed within
48 hours of detention. The embarrassment of commencing cases that cannot be successfully
prosecuted is considered an effective sanction against unnecessary detention. See Note, Ju-
venile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized Justice, 79 Harv. L. Rev.
775, 792 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Harvard Study].
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to detain within a specified number of days122 have also proved ineffective.
Because the police department is the only agency which is available
24 hours a day, seven days a week, 23 it is frequently called on to detain
juveniles. Although juveniles can be detained at any time, 24 procedures
for release must fit into the more relaxed eight hour day, five days a week
schedules of courts and probation departments. 20
Several suggestions have been made to alleviate this problem: 1. An
intake officer should be on duty after regular court hours.120 2. A juvenile
should not be detained for a period of longer than 24 hours without the
filing of a petition. This rule should operate continuously irrespective of
Sundays or holidays.2 7 3. Police should be required to furnish a complete
report at the time of detention, describing the reasons for their recom-
mendations. 28
122. Although many statutes require a court order for detention, the extent of actual
judicial review contemplated by such provisions is uncertain. Only Idaho seems to require
the child actually to be brought before the court within 24 hours when the court must
hand down its order. This encourages the court to independently assess the need for deten-
tion, rather than to perfunctorily approve a police officer's report.
123. Juv. Delinq. and Youth Crime, supra note 1, at 13.
124. That a higher proportion of juveniles are detained after court hours has long been
suspected. Recent California statistics confirm this pattern in nine out of eleven counties
studied. In three counties virtually all children apprehended after work hours are auto-
matically detained. California Study, supra note 12, at 71-72.
125. For example, in one county where petitions are routinely filed before detention, when
a child is apprehended after 3:00 p.m., the required paper work cannot be completed In time
to take children to the detention home that day. These children are held in special juvenile
quarters, until the next day when they are transferred to the detention home. Natl Council
of Juv. Ct. Judges, Study of Peoria County, Illinois 6 (1965).
In one Ohio county, it is reported that police can "cool" a child by apprehending and
detaining him after court hours, thereby avoiding court intake screening until the next court
day. Trumbull County Study, supra note 50, at 31.
126. Sheridan suggests that in larger communities, intake staff coverage regarding need
for detention should be provided at least until midnight, after which consultation should be
available by telephone. Sheridan, Juvenile Court Intake, 2 J. Fain. Law 139, 152 (1962).
One smaller community has succeeded in vastly reducing its detention rate by limiting
detention authorization on weekends and after 5:00 p.m. to the county Probation Director
whose phone number is listed with law enforcement officials. See Panel Discussion: "State
Responsibility for Regional Detention: A Means of Getting Out of Jails," 19 Juv. Ct. Judges
J. 67 (1968) (Statement by Carl J. Constantino). See also S. Norman & A. Barstis, supra note
3, at 8.
127. The Children's Bureau requires the petition to be filed within 24 hours, not exempt-
ing weekends or holidays. See Children's Bureau Standards, supra note 8, at 61.
128. Many jurisdictions now require such a report. See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22-2-2(4)
(Supp. 1967); D.C. Code Encycl. Ann. § 16-2306 (1966); Ga. Code Ann. § 24-2416 (Supp.
1968); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 571-32 (1968); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 208.110(4) (1962); Miss. Code
Ann. § 7187-06 (Supp. 1969); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 10-608.1(4) (Supp. 1969); N.M.
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B. Intake
The second decision about detention is made by the intake officer when
he releases a child to his family or continues the detention initiated by
the police.129 The worker is supposed to obtain information about the
juvenile from the court, school, and social records.' In addition, he is
supposed to conduct interviews with the parents and the child. The intake
worker might release some of the children detained by the police on the
basis of this information. However, if they release a great number of
children who were detained by the police, they must be using different
criteria.'
For example, one nationwide study found that of all children detained
overnight or longer, 43%o' were eventually released by intake. " 2 In Afflu-
ent County, about 33%o of the detained children were released by intake,
while a 1966 study in the District of Columbia found an even greater
difference between the views of police and intake workers. The report
stated:
Although the police and intake workers rely on the same detention criteria, about
75 percent of all first offenders and a substantial percentage of all juveniles detained
by the police are released within a week by the intake workers before they ever ap-
pear in court. In some cases overnight detention may be unavoidable because parents
cannot be located; in others the detention decision reveals a basic difference of views
between police and intake worker.' 33
Overuse of detention facilities has been attributed to others besides the
police. 34 For example, one Massachusetts study found that probation
officers in certain counties "used detention for treatment purposes. They
Stat. Ann. § 13-8-43 (Replacement 1968); N.D. Cent Code § 27-20-15(1) (b) (Supp. 1969);
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.31 (Page 1968); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-1095.17(b) (Supp. 1968);
Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-90 (Supp. 1969); Uniform Juv. CL Act § 15(a)(2); Model Rules for
Juv. Cts. rule 12. Detention Standards, supra note 2, at 24-25 suggests a copy of the report
should go to the probation department immediately.
129. For example, in Baltimore, Maryland, where except for "very serious" cases children
detained by police are not brought into court since detention is controlled by an agreement
between probation and police, each evening a probation officer visits the local detention
quarters and releases children he feels should be returned to their parents. S. Norman, Pre-
court Detention of Children in Baltimore: A NCCD Study 18 (1963).
Probation decision-making is sometimes precluded. For example, in Massachusetts the
arresting officer may insist that the child be detained pending arraignment. See Mass. Ann.
Laws ch. 119, § 67 (1965). See also Massachusetts Study, supra note 74, at 17.
130. Detention Standards, supra note 2, at 27.
131. Id.
132. D. Freed & P. Wald, supra note 3, at 100.
133. D.C. Crime Commission Study, supra note 47, at 667.
134. See California Study, supra note 12, at 79; D. Freed & P. Wald, supra note 3, at 99.
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felt that giving the child a 'taste of confinement' could serve as a deterrent
to further delinquency. '; 135
A study of a Texas county also illustrated the view of some probation
officers that detention is desirable as a punishment. When questioned
about the fact that 39% of detained juveniles were released after three
to four days without any further action by the juvenile justice system,
a probation officer explained that after these children had spent a few days
in jail, "they didn't need anything more" in the way of service from the
court. 3
6
Intake officers are also influenced by the views of their judges. Un-
fortunately, some judges' views reflect neither the criteria expressed in
the statutes nor those advocated by recognized experts in the area. For
example, intake workers in one community reported that the judge wanted
all narcotic offenders detained. 31 7 Workers in other communities in the
same state also reported that some judges instructed them to detain all
recidivists while others said they were supposed to detain all alleged
felons. 38
It is necessary to have written guides for detaining juveniles if the de-
cision to detain or release is ever going to be based on anything besides
geographical accident. Such guides are needed at the police, intake, and
judicial levels of decision. A community cannot be expected to achieve
justice for alleged juvenile offenders if the criteria for detention depend
on whether the decision maker is a policeman, an intake worker, or a
judge. This chaotic state of affairs is compounded further by criteria
variation from police officer to police officer, intake worker to intake
worker, and judge to judge.
C. Judicial Review
In many jurisdictions, a third decision on detention is made by the
juvenile court judge. Most commentators consider mandatory detention
hearings as a constitutional requirement or a practical necessity to control
detention effectively.'3 9 Only twelve juvenile codes specifically provide for
such hearings. 4 9 Eight of these require that the hearings be held within
135. Massachusetts Study, supra note 74, at 26.
136. Texas Study, supra note 75, at 146. See also Cook County Study, supra note 90.
137. California Study, supra note 12, at 35.
138. Id.
139. Dorsen & Rezneck, supra note 3, at 36; Juv. Delinq. and Youth Crime, supra note 1,
at 37; modifications of these positions: Children's Bur., Standards for Juv. and Fain. Cts.
Modifications of Positions Taken 3 (1968); D. Freed & P. Wald, supra note 3, at 104.
140. Detention Hearings by statute or rule: Alaska Stat. § 47.10.140(c) (1962) ; Alaska
Rules of Ct. Proc. and Administration, Rules of Juv. Proc. 7(b) (1968); Cal. Welfare &
Inst'ns Code § 632 (West 1966); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22-2-3(3) (Supp. 1967); Hawaii Rev.
Stat. § 571-32(a) (1968); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 37, § 703-5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969); Md. Ann.
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24, 48, or 72 hours, one makes no provision, and Utah and South Dakota
merely provide for a prompt hearing, a virtually meaningless require-
ment.141 One Utah study reported that the juvenile is not brought before
the court immediately because it would interfere with the court's schedule
and detention home program. 42 There are other jurisdictions which hold
mandatory hearings, but without statutory authority. '4 3
Assistance of counsel is necessary if detention hearings are to be mean-
ingful.'1 While only a few states provide for the right to court appointed
counsel by statute, 45 some other courts make such appointments, even
Code art. 26, § 70-13(b) (Supp. 1969); Minn. Stat. Ann. Foil. Ch. 260, Rule 7-3 (Supp. 1969);
N.Y. Faro. Ct. Act § 729 (1963). The bearing contemplates a preliminary inquiry into juris-
diction as well as determination of detention. N.D. Cent. Code § 27-20-17(2) (Supp. 1969) ;
S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. § 26-8-23.1 (Supp. 1969); Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-91(1) (Supp.
1969); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 643(a) (Supp. 1969).
Idaho and Indiana provide for detention hearings only on request. Idaho Code Ann.
§ 16-1811(c) (5) (Supp. 1969); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-3212 (Supp. 1968). Indiana allows the child
or "any person in his behalf" to make the request, but requires it to be in writing. Idaho
does not require the request to be made by any specific person or in any specific form, but
since written notice of the hearing is given only to parents or guardians, they are the only
ones in a position to request the hearing.
Denying a hearing as a right has been condemned. If the request is left to the child, he is
often bewildered, inarticulate or too young to understand. Parents, often the only interested
parties, may be psychologically unable to affirmatively request a hearing, "Cyjet at a manda-
tory detention hearing, such parents, aided by counsel, may be found able to care for the
child pending adjudication, and thus the child can be released." Model Rules for Juv. Cts.
rule 13, Comment.
The Standard Acts allow only the parents to request a detention hearing, precluding any
possibility of release to another's custody for a child whose parents do not want him, or
cannot be found. NCCD Standard Farn. Ct. Act § 17(1) (1959); NCCD Standard Juv. Ct.
Act § 17(1) (1968).
Minnesota, in addition to its elaborate provision for formal mandatory detention hearings
allow parents to request a summary detention hearing within the first 24 hours. See Mian.
Stat. Ann. Foll. Ch. 260, Rule 7-2(1) (Supp. 1969).
All statutory references in this section are to the above provisions.
141. Those with time limits are Alaska, California, Colorado, Illinois, Minnesota, New
York, North Dakota, Utah and Vermont. Without provision is Maryland.
142. Harvard Study, supra note 121, at 792.
143. For example, since May 1968 the District of Columbia requires the child to be
brought before a judge for a detention hearing within 24 hours of his apprehension. 19 Juv.
Ct. Judges J. 44 (1968). In Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, detention hearings are held within
72 hours of initial detention and within 48 hours if the juvenile denies delinquency. Harvard
Study, supra note 121, at 792. In Baltimore, Maryland detention hearings are held within 24
hours and the court sits daily and on Saturdays. D. Freed & P. Wald, supra note 3, at 103-04.
144. Dyson & Dyson, supra note 85, at 18.
145. Cal. Welfare & Inst'ns Code § 627.5 (West Supp. 1969); N.Y. Farn. CL Act § 728(a)
(1963) ; N.D. Cent. Code § 27-20-17(2) (Supp. 1969). In Wisconsin, whose statute is silent
concerning the right to counsel at detention hearings, a federal court judge has held that the
constitutional right to counsel is extended to detention hearings by In re Gault, 387 U.S. I
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though they are not required. 46 The lawyer has many tasks at the
detention hearing. He should inquire into the court's jurisdiction and
the evidence supporting the request for detention. He may also suggest
alternatives to detention if the child requires care outside the home.
Finally, he should offer advice, not only in respect to issues at stake
in the detention hearing, but also in other matters which might influence
the outcome of the case,147 i.e., guidance during the detention inter-
rogation. 48
Given these multiple duties, it is obvious that a lawyer needs some time
to prepare for a detention hearing. Initial notification of right to counsel
at the detention hearing itself clearly provides no preparation time. Al-
though the New York law provides that the court shall advise a child of
the right to counsel and requires the judge to adjourn the hearing so the
child can send for his parents and counsel, it is silent on the subject of
time for preparation. 140
California's provision which allows a one day continuance for prepara-
tion has been criticized as too short. 10 Unfortunately, allowing a longer
postponement will lengthen the detention period as well as the preparation
time.
The Model Rules require that the intake officer of a shelter or deten-
tion facility notify the child and his parents of his right to court-ap-
pointed counsel.' 51 This procedure insures notice of the right to counsel
before the hearing, however, only if intake personnel are on duty at nights
(1967). Baldwin v. Lewis, 300 F. Supp. 1220, 1232 (E.D. Wis. 1969). S.D. Comp. Laws. Ann.
§ 26-8-21 (1967), § 26-8-22.1 (Supp 1969), provides for notification of right to counsel at
the child's first appearance in court.
146. E.g., the District of Columbia. See letter from Morris Miller, Chief Judge, The
Juvenile Court of the District of Columbia to Elyce Z. Ferster, October 13, 1969. The project
observed such appointments being made in the Juvenile Court of Affluent County.
147. Rosenheim and Skoler, The Lawyer's Role at Intake and Detention Stages of
Juvenile Court Proceedings, 11 Crime and Delinq. 167, 170 (1965).
148. See In re Dennis, 20 App. Div. 2d 86, 244 N.Y.S.2d 798 (1963), where "the most
serious irregularity" in the case was the detention of the boy by the police for four days,
during which time he confessed after questioning, and was prohibited from seeing his relatives
or a lawyer.
The Model Rules for Juvenile Courts, although prohibiting interrogation of the child in a
detention facility by law enforcement officers without an attorney present, allow interrogation
by a staff member of the facility and a probation officer. See Model Rules for Juv. Cts. rule
14 (1969). However, questioning by these persons can be damaging. See Leach v. State, 428
S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1968), where the conviction was reversed because, inter alla,
a probation officer obtained information by questioning the 12 year old juvenile during her
two month detention, before a lawyer had been appointed.
149. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 728(a) (1963).
150. Boches, supra note 117, at 78-79.
151. Model Rules for Juv. Cts. rule 13.
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and on weekends. Since they are not available at these times in many
jurisdictions, the police should be required to notify the juvenile and his
parents of the right to counsel at the time the police decide to detain him.
The extent to which detention hearings will control unwarranted deten-
tion depends not only on the presence of counsel, but also on such factors
as the criteria on which the decision to detain is based, the evidence which
may be admitted at the hearing, and the scope of the hearing. Illinois is
the only state whose law requires that a determination of probable cause
be made at the detention hearing.5 2
The Model Rules, and jurisdictions with similar provisions, limit the
scope of the detention hearing to determining the necessity for deten-
tion.' 53 One such statute provides that "the sole purpose" of the detention
hearing is to determine "to the satisfaction of court" that the child's
continued detention would be "to his best interests . . . or that public
safety and protection reasonably require such detention."' 54 However, two
recent federal court decisions held that juveniles detained on suspicion of
criminal conduct are entitled to a judicial determination of probable
cause under the United States Constitution.
Baldwin v. Lewis'55 questioned the validity of the detention of a seven-
teen-year-old boy suspected of setting a fire to a high school auditorium.
On April 22, 1969, about three weeks after the fire, Richard Lee was
taken into custody by the Milwaukee police and delivered to the Chil-
dren's Court Detention Center. The detention decision was reviewed by a
court intake worker the next day and by the Children's Court on April 25.
Richard was ordered detained because 1"[t]he child is almost certain to
commit an offense dangerous to himself or the community before the
court disposition .. ..2 16
On April 28, in a habeas corpus hearing on Richard's detention, the
Circuit Court of Milwaukee County found that:
[T]he State was not obliged to show that there was probable cause to believe that
a crime had been committed and, further, that there was no obligation to show
probable cause to believe that the petitioner had committed an act which would have
been a crime had he been an adult, because the Wisconsin Statutes do not contain
such a requirement. 157
152. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 37, § 703-6 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969).
153. See Alaska, Rules of Ct. Proc. and Administration, Rules of Juv. Proc. 7(c) (Supp.
1966), which supercedes the statutory provision for a probable cause determination in Alaska
Stat. § 47.10.140(c-d) (1962); Cal. Welfare & Instns Code § 635 (West 1966); Colo. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 22-2-3(3) (Supp. 1967); Utah Code Ann. § 55-10-91 (Supp. 1969); VL Stat.
Ann. tit. 33, § 643(a) (Supp. 1969).
154. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 643(a) (Supp. 1969).
155. 300 F. Supp. 1220 (E. D. Wis. 1969).
156. Id. at 1224.
157. Id. at 1226. See Wis. Stat. Ann. § 48.29 (1957).
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The federal district court disagreed. It found a detention hearing to
be a proceeding which may result in the deprivation of liberty for an
indeterminate period of time. Therefore, under a reasonable interpretation
of the Supreme Court's decision in In re Gault, ' a detention hearing
must satisfy all requirements of due process under the fourteenth amend-
ment.5 9 The court also said that detention prior to trial without a finding
of probable cause denies the juvenile the fundamental fairness which the
14th amendment is designed to protect.160
Under Wisconsin law, detention of an adult, without a determination of
probable cause, for a period longer than is necessary to determine whether
he should be released, violates the fourteenth amendment.10' The Baldwin
case holds that Gault requires that the same standard be applied to a
detained juvenile.' 62
In the other Federal case, Cooley v. Stone,'0 3 a sixteen-year-old boy sus-
pected of burglary was detained in the District of Columbia. A judicial
inquiry into probable cause was requested by Cooley's counsel at both the
detention hearing'" and the initial hearing.'> The request was denied at
both hearings. Habeas corpus was sought and obtained in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia:
"No person can be lawfully held in penal custody by the state without a prompt
judicial determination of probable cause. The Fourth Amendment so provides and this
constitutional mandate applies to juveniles as well as adults."'106
The U.S. court of appeals affirmed the judgment saying that a judicial
determination of probable cause is required by both the fourth and fifth
amendments to the United States Constitution.0 7
The principal difference between these two federal cases is that Cooley
says that probable cause must be determined no later than the initial hear-
ing, which is a week or two after detention in the District of Columbia.0"
The Baldwin case requires that a determination of probable cause be
158. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
159. 300 F. Supp. at 1232.
160. Id.
161. Phillips v. State, 29 Wis. 2d 521, 139 N.W.2d 41 (1966).
162. 300 F. Supp. at 1232.
163. 414 F.2d 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
164. The initial hearing, analogous to the arraignment in adult criminal cases, is held
pursuant to internal court rule in the District of Columbia. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. (quoting the district court decision).
167. Id. at 1214.
168. If a Legal Aid Agency attorney or a private attorney represented the juvenile at
the detention hearing and remains in the case, the Judge, at the detention hearing, fixes a
date for the initial hearing within a week or two. Letter from Morris Miller, supra note 146.
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made as soon as possible to determine whether the child should be re-
leased. 6 9 Therefore, a probable cause hearing would take place earlier
under Baldwin than Cooley because the decision about detention would
not require more than two or three days. If other courts follow the Bald-
win and Cooley decisions, the emphasis on detention will be reduced but
not eliminated.
The criteria and procedures used at the hearings, to determine whether
a child should be detained, will affect the number of children subsequently
detained. The criteria presently used by many states is so vague that it
is subject to a considerable amount of interpretation. Provisions which
allow detention when release would be "inexpedient," "impracticable,"
or "undesirable,"" or when detention is required to protect the person
or property of the child or of others,171 make it possible to detain virtually
every child. There are problems not only in predicting whether the child
will commit a dangerous act, but also in trying to define the term "danger-
ous act."' 2
The degree of proof needed to detain a child is frequently uncertain.
The decision is easy when a juvenile has run away from home or not
appeared at a court hearing in the past. But, in the absence of such a
history, what evidence should be required to show that he may not appear
in court?
Other problems concern detention hearing procedures. At present the
scope and conduct of these hearings varies widely. The most comprehen-
sive and precise procedure for conducting detention hearings is that set
out in the Minnesota rules, which calls for a formal adversary proceed-
ing, including oral arguments, legal representation for both sides, and the
right to cross-examination. Confrontation is not provided, however, be-
cause hearsay evidence is admissable 7 3 California is the only state in
which the juvenile has a right both to confrontation and cross-examination
of witnesses. 4 More typical is the North Dakota provision which pro-
vides for an "informal hearing.' 75
The recently decided Baldwin case casts doubt on the constitutionality
of informal hearings. In Baldwin, the court said a juvenile court judge
cannot base his conclusions and order "upon facts or documents which
169. See text accompanying notes 160 and 161 supra.
170. See note 64 and accompanying text.
171. See notes 40, 41, and 55 supra.
172. See pp. 167-68 supra.
173. Minn. Stat. Ann. Foil. Ch. 260, Rule 7-3(3) (b-c) (Supp. 1969).
174. Cal. Welfare & Inst'ns Code § 702.5 (West Supp. 1969).
175. N.D. Cent. Code § 27-20-17(2) (Supp. 1969). The Uniform Juv. Ct. Act § 17(b)
provides for an "informal" hearing.
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are never identified, made part of the record, or made available to
counsel for inspection.' 78
It has been argued that detention hearings, especially if. conducted
under Gault rules, will put an extra burden on the court and may increase
the length of detention while the child is waiting for a hearing. 7 Hear-
ings, however, are likely to decrease detention because the decision to
release the child is made at that time. Otherwise the child languishes in
detention waiting for disposition. 7 '
The belief that detention hearings will prolong detention assumes that
the courts will hold a large number of hearings. This is a reasonable
expectation only if the present high detention rate continues. However,
if the criteria for detention and the evidence required to support it are
clarified by decision, the number of children detained by police and in-
take officers will be sharply reduced. Also, it is important to remember
that detention, a temporary institutionalization, is a serious intervention
in a child's life. For that reason, the due process clause requires a full
hearing in a detention proceeding. 79
III. LENGTH AND PLACE OF DETENTION
A large number of children are detained longer than one would expect
from the phrase "temporary detention." Only a few states effectively
limit the period of detention by requiring the fact finding hearing to be
held within a specified period of time after detention.'"' A few others
merely give priority to detained juveniles when scheduling adjudicatory
hearings.' Some states limit how long the court may detain a child but
they also allow the court to renew its order.'"2
176. 300 F. Supp. at 1232.
177. Welch, Delinquency Proceedings-Fundamental Fainiess for the Accused in a Quasi-
Criminal Forum, 50 Minn. L. Rev. 653, 692 (1966).
178. NCCD Standard Juv. Ct. Act § 17, Comment (1968); Standard Fain. Ct. Act § 17,
Comment (1959).
179. 300 F. Supp. at 1232.
180. See Cal. Welfare & Inst'ns Code §§ 638, 657 (West Supp. 1969) (hearing within
fifteen days with continuances only on day to day basis at respondent's request); Ill. Ann.
Stat. ch. 37, § 704-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1969) (hearing within ten days, or later if necessary
to serve the summons or give statutory notice) ; New York Fain. Ct. Act §§ 747, 748 (Supp.
1969) (hearing within three days of petition's filing, but less severe, yet meaningful restrictions
on adjournment). One New York case condemned the granting of a motion to adjourn where
the detained child's attorney had opposed it. People v. Poland, 44 Misc. 2d 769, 225 N.Y.S.2d
5 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
181. E.g., N.D. Cent. Code § 27-20-29(5) (Supp. 1969).
182. Alaska Rules of Ct. Proc. and Administration, Rules of Juv. Proc. 7(a) (Supp. 1966)
limits the order to thirty days, allowing renewal upon written findings and approval of a
superior court. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 13.04.053 (1968) allows thirty days detention under
a court order, with no apparent limits on renewals.
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Unfortunately, substantial numbers of children are detained for periods
much longer than the two week period recommended by the NCCD.'1
Complete statistics on length of detention are difficult to obtain as are
most detention statistics. However, some information on the subject was
obtained by the NCCD in its survey for the President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice. The survey found
that in jails and detention homes, the period of detention ranged from
1 to 68 days.""4 Fifty percent of the children, as tabulated in their sample
counties, stayed more than 16 days."8 "
NCCD concluded that the long stays result from the misconceptions
shared by many judges "that these facilities are all-purpose institutions
for: (a) meeting health or mental needs; (b) punishment or 'treatment'
in lieu of a training school commitment; (c) retarded children until a
state institution can receive them; (d) pregnant girls until they can be
placed prior to delivery; (e) brain-injured children involved in delin-
quency; (f) protection from irate parents who might harm the child;
(g) a material witness in an adult case; (h) giving the delinquent 'short
sharp shock' treatment; (i) educational purposes ('[h]e'll have to go to
school in detention'); (j) therapy; (k) 'ethical and moral' training;
(1) lodging until an appropriate foster home or institution turns up.' 801
The Juvenile Study also obtained recent data on length of detention
and found that large numbers of children are detained for longer than
two weeks. 8 The most alarming figures were those for the District
of Columbia.88 This decision to detain a juvenile is a most significant
one. He will be removed from his home, his friends and his school for a
considerable period of time. Yet in 1965, approximately 88,000 children
were held in jails throughout the United States. 8 '
Jail has been described as the "weakest link of the entire correction
system."190 "Even when a competent sheriff maintains good internal dis-
cipline, proper segregation of inmates, and satisfactory housekeeping con-
ditions, the usual absence of a rehabilitation program, detrimental to adult
prisoners, is even worse for juveniles." " '
183. Detention Standards, supra note 2, at 30.
184. Juvenile Detention, supra note 1, at 34.
185. Id. at 35.
186. Id.
187. See App. D.
188. District of Columbia Receiving Home, Weekly Master Population Sheet I (Sept. 28,
1969). See App. E.
189. Juvenile Detention, supra note 1, at 14-15.
190. Eaton, Detention Facilities in Non-Metropolitan Counties, 17 Juv. Ct. Judges J.
9, 10 (1966).
191. Id.
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Abuses in juvenile jail detentions were highlighted in a Washington
newspaper account of disciplinary practices in a suburban jail, where
juveniles were sent because of overcrowding in the regular juvenile deten-
tion facilities. At least one "misbehaving" juvenile had been placed in
solitary confinement on a bread and water diet; a regime without parallel
in other Washington, D.C. suburbs according to the newspaper account. 1 2
The story noted that solitary confinement is used in all jurisdictions for
juveniles but without dietary restrictions.0 3
Jail "atrocities" are not confined to the Washington metropolitan area.
A witness before a Senate Judiciary Subcommittee reported that in the
Cook County jail juveniles fourteen years old or older were sexually
molested, tortured, beaten, and murdered by other prisoners. 104 Other
examples have been noted. Although there have been no court decisions
on the suitability of a jail as a place of detention, two recent cases chal-
lenged the suitability of detention homes in the District of Columbia.
Detention facilities, since they are intended to be used for very short
periods, do not have, and are not intended to have, programs comparable
to those in the facilities for adjudicated juveniles, nor can they realisti-
cally duplicate a home environment. The kind of care that they must
provide has not been established as yet.
In the first case attacking the suitability of detention facilities, Creek
v. Stone,'0 5 the juvenile alleged that the D.C. Receiving Home had no
provision for the psychiatric assistance he needed. Despite his repeated
requests, the juvenile court refused to hold a hearing regarding the suit-
ability of the receiving home as a place of detention. 10 Although the
appeal was dismissed as moot, the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia pointed out that the juvenile code establishes a legal
right to custody not inconsistent with the parens patriae premise of the
law.1 7 The court also said that when a juvenile court is presented with
a substantial complaint that needed treatment is not provided, it should
make an appropriate inquiry to insure that the statutory criteria as applied
to juveniles is being met.'
Wilson v. Stone'99 also raised the question of the suitability of a deten-
tion facility. The juvenile alleged that the Receiving Home Annex did not
have a proper education, recreation or therapy program. The court or-
192. Washington Post, Feb. 13, 1969, § F at 1, col. 2.
193. Id.
194. Washington Post, Mar. 7, 1969, § A at 11, col. 1.
195. 379 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
196. Id. at 108.
197. Id. at 111.
198. Id.
199. No. 69-3250-j (D.C. Juv. Ct. Sept. 10, 1969).
[Vol. 38
JUVENILE DETENTION
dered the detention facility to conduct classes for the same number of
hours per day as the public schools.200 It is worth noting that although
Wilson was detained for more than three months, waiting for a hearing
because he could not be trusted in the community, the hearing resulted
in his return to the community. 1
IV. TiE NEED FOR DETENTION
The Wilson case was not an isolated incident of a detained juvenile
being returned to the community after his adjudication hearing. In fact,
the NCCD study showed that of 409,218 children detained, approximately
167,000 were neither committed to an institution nor placed on proba-
tion. 02 Either the court found that these children were not delinquent
when the hearing finally occurred or no delinquency petition was filed.
Justification for detention in these cases seems completely lacking.
The Juvenile Study obtained statistics from five communities in order
to get more detailed and recent statistics on the disposition of detained
children. The results showed that the vast majority of detained children
remained in the community after adjudication. In Massachusetts only
25.9% of all children held in detention homes were removed from the
community.2 3 In Sangamon County, Illinois,""° Trumbull County, Ohio,2 3
and Tarrant County, Texas,0 6 only 22o, 19.5% and 9.7% of the detained
population were removed from the community.
A more complete picture of dispositions of detained juveniles can be
obtained by taking a comprehensive look at the detention picture in one
jurisdiction.
Of the 284 juveniles in the "Affluent County" sample, 55 or 19.4%
were detained. This rate of detention compares favorably with the "stan-
dard" rate established by the NCCD, as determined by the rate of police
referrals to juvenile courts." 7
Eighteen (32.7%) of the 55 children were released by the intake
department of Affluent County Juvenile Court. An additional eleven,
(20.0%o) were released from detention following a detention hearing.
Thus, the court decided that thirty-four (61.8%o) juveniles detained by
the police did not require continued detention.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Juvenile Detention, supra note 1, at 36.
203. Massachusetts Study, supra note 74.
204. U.S. Children's Bureau, A Study of Services for Delinquent Children in Sangamon
County, Ilinois. pt. II, at 5 (1967).
205. Trumbull County Study, supra note 50, pt. H, at S.
206. Texas Study, supra note 75, pt. II, at 8.
207. Detention Standards, supra note 2, at 19.
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More than three-fourths of the detained children remained in the com-
munity after court action on their case was completed. In fact, no petition
at all was filed for one-fourth of the children.
The detention of 45 of these 55 children is, at best, highly questionable.
V. BAIL
The numerous problems about the purpose, length and conditions of
detention lead naturally to a consideration of extending the right to bail
to juveniles.
Ten states grant juveniles the right to bail.208 In only two of these
jurisdictions is bail the sole means of release.20 9 The others also pro-
vide for release to the parents or guardians on their promise to bring the
child to court.210 Five states specifically prohibit the use of bail in juve-
nile cases,"' and the constitutionality of one of their statues is question-
able. In Smith v. McCravy,1 2 a Kentucky county court stated that
Gault left little doubt that the Supreme Court intends to extend the
Bill of Rights to all individuals, whether juvenile or adult, and held that
the state statute denying bail to juveniles is unconstitutional.218 The re-
maining jurisdictions either have no provisions on the subject or the pro-
208. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 45-227 (1947); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22-8-6(3) (1963); Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 119, § 67 (1958); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 712A.17 (1968); N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 110-27 (1966); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 1112 (Supp. 1969); S.D. Comp.
Laws Ann. & 26-8-21 (1967); W. Va. Code Ann. § 49-5-3 (1966). Two states Imply
a right to bail. Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-2815 (1956); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 13.04.115 (1962).
Ten states provide for discretionary release on bail. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17-65 (1958) ;
La. Rev. Stat. § 13:1577 (1968); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 2608 (1965), as amended
(Supp. 1969); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 260.171(3) (Supp. 1969) (after detention hearing); Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 43-205.03 (1943) ; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 110-27 (1966) ; Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-251
(Supp. 1968); Utah Code Ann. tit. 33, § 55-10-91 (Supp. 1968); Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-197
(1) (Replacement 1960). Maryland now provides that "[t]he court may require security for
the appearance of a child in form or amount the court determines necessary." Md. Ann.
Code art. 26, § 70-11(c) (Supp. 1969). Except for Tennessee and Vermont, these statutes
provide other means of release. None of these statutes confer a right to be released. Only
where there is no other provision for release does the child benefit from the possibility of
being admitted to bail. The six other statutes contain no standards for requiring bond rather
than the promise of the parent. Discretionary bail benefits the juvenile only if he would be
released on monetary bond where the court would have considered him a poor risk on his
parent's promise.
209. Arkansas and West Virginia.
210. Colorado, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South
Dakota, and Washington.
211. Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 571-32(f) (1968); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 208.110 (1962); Ore.
Rev. Stat. § 419.583 (1968); P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 34, § 2007(d) (Supp. 1968); Utah Code
Ann. § 55-10-91 (Supp. 1967). Utah lifts the prohibition for children who live outside the
state.
212. 1 Crim. L. Rep. 2153 (1967).
213. Id.
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visions imply there is no right to bail for juveniles. -14 The few court
decisions on the subject conflict. For example, two Wisconsin county
courts reached opposite conclusions215 on the right to bail in decisions
issuing one month apart in 1969.216
The two principal arguments against an absolute right to bail for juve-
niles are that juvenile court proceedings are "not criminal" in nature,21T
and that bail is an inappropriate release procedure for juveniles.218 The
first argument, that juvenile proceedings are "civil," has been significantly
undercut by the Supreme Court decision In re Gault,"0 in which the
Court said that "juvenile proceedings to determine 'delinquency,' which
may lead to commitment to a state institution must be regarded as
'criminal' .... ))220
Old rationales die hard. At least one post-Gadt state court decision has
denied bail to a juvenile on the ground that bail applied to "criminal"
proceedings, and juvenile proceedings are not "criminal. - -1
Gault does not significantly affect the vitality of the second standard
objection to bail for juveniles. The weight of expert opinion is that mon-
etary bail is inappropriate for juveniles. The principal argument is that
a child's freedom should not depend on his ability to pay for it.-' Juve-
niles have neither property nor money of their own to use as collateral.2
A monetary bail system for juveniles, therefore, makes the juvenile's
freedom depend on his families financial resources. Since many families
of alleged juvenile delinquents have low or marginal income,=- the result
for many juveniles would be detention for poverty.
Bail is also said to be inappropriate for juveniles when the reason for
214. E.g., Idaho Code Ann. § 16-1811 (Supp. 1969).
215. Wronski v. Frohmader, No. 349-590 (Milwaukee Co. Cir. CL, July 5, 1967).
216. Mayberry v. Administrator (Milwaukee Co. Cir. CL, Aug. 4, 1967).
217. See e.g., In re Castro, 243 Cal. App. 2d 402, 52 Cal. Rptr. 469 (1966); Ex Parte
Cromwell, 232 Md. 305, 192 A.2d 775 (1963); Estes v. Hopp, 73 Wash. 2d 263, 438 P2d 205
(1968).
218. See Juv. Delinq. and Youth Crime, supra note 1, at 36; Ketcham, Guidelines from
Gault: Revolutionary Requirements and Reappraisal, 53 Va. L. Rev. 1700, 1715 (1967);
Children's Bureau Standards, supra note 8, at 63.
219. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
220. Id. at 49. Although the court was not immediately concerned with pre-adjudicatory
proceedings, the logic of this holding extends to detention proceedings leading to temporary
institutionalization. See Skoler, Counsel in Juvenile Court Proceedings-A Total Criminal
Justice Perspective, 8 J. Farn. L. 243, 259 (1968).
221. Estes v. Hopp, 73 Wash. 2d 263, 269, 438 P.2d 205, 208 (1968).
222. Juv. Delinq. and Youth Crime, supra note 1, at 36.
223. Ketcham, supra note 218, at 1715; see e.g., FuIwood v. Stone, 394 F.2d 939, 941
(D.C. Cir. 1967), where although the District Court upheld a constitutional right to bail, it
set the bond too high for the juvenile to meet it.
224. Children's Bureau Standards, supra note 8, at 63.
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detention is that release would be detrimental to the child's welfare.2 6
The examples given to support this argument often involve situations
where the parents are clearly unfit.226 In any such case where release
would be detrimental to the juvenile because of his parents' deficiencies,
a neglect petition may be the proper remedy.227
These arguments have convinced at least three courts that their juris-
dictions' statutory schemes were "more than an adequate substitute for
bail." ' One, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, warned that the
adequacy of its statutory scheme depended on the "faithful observance"
of statutory principles allowing release on recognizance, favoring con-
servation of family ties, and guaranteeing " 'custody, care, and discipline
as nearly... equivalent to that which should have been given him by his
parents,'" in the case of detention.2 "
However, the present article shows that these statutory objectives
plainly are not being met.22 Perhaps this is why there is support for a
bail system in addition to other means of release.3 '
VI. CONCLUSION
This article began as an inquiry into factors that cause the high rate
of juvenile detention. The rate has been criticized by innumerable com-
mentators, as has almost every other aspect of juvenile detention.
Very few communities, however, have adopted suggested solutions. One
must assume that there are valid reasons why reforms have not been
adopted.
225. "Release as of right plainly may interfere with the protection and care required In
some cases .. . ." Juv. Delinq. and Youth Crime, supra note 1, at 36. See also Note, The
Right to Bail and the Pre-"Trial" Detention of Juveniles Accused of "Crime," 18 Vand. L.
Rev. 2096, 2097 (1965).
226. See Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 Minn. L. Rev. 547, 552 n.21
(1957), citing the case of a young girl who had sexual relations with a man in "her mother's
bed at her home in New Orleans, with her mother's apparent consent and approval;" and
the case of a fifteen year old who was abused by her stepfather.
227. See pp. 168-70 supra.
228. Fulwood v. Stone, 394 F.2d 939, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1967); In re Castro, 243 Cal. App.
2d 402, 52 Cal. Rptr. 469 (1966). An earlier district court case in the District of Columbia
held that the federal constitutional guarantee prevailed over a statute which was silent on
the subject of bail for juveniles, since no statute is necessary to implement a constitutional
provision. Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1960). One commentator has disagreed
that the California scheme is an adequate substitute for bail. See Boches, supra note 117,
at 75.
229. 394 F.2d at 943 quoting the District of Columbia statute.
230. See pp. 186-89 supra.
231. See Note, supra note 225, at 2108. Eight statutes provide for a right to bail along
with other release provisions. See text accompanying notes 208 & 209 supra.
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One possibility is that the generally accepted policy of releasing most
juveniles to their homes to await court action is wrong. If this is the case,
the fact that the detention rate remains high is to be expected. On the
other hand, if the policy is correct, it is most important to find out why
the criticisms and recommendations are ignored time after time.
The available evidence clearly indicates that the policy is not wrong.
Large numbers of juveniles are detained and then released to the com-
munity, either without any delinquency petition, or after the adjudication
decision. Therefore, it seems unlikely that their detention was necessary.
It is possible, of course, that information not currently available would
show that a larger number of persons need to be detained than the ex-
perts have stated. Such information might also show that disputed criteria
are more justifiable than they seem at present.
Unfortunately, the absence of useful information occurs for the same
reason as the high detention rates. The fact that twenty-two states do not
even bother to keep any detention statistics documents the broad indif-
ference to the problem. The statistics in other states are usually so in-
complete that they are useless for planning personnel, facilities, or
anything else. The absence of data, crucial for making any changes in
the present detention system, is a major block to solving the problem.
The most important, but least available, data is the reason why each
detained child has been held. Without this information, it is impossible
to tell if the detention is unjustified under existing criteria.
How many children are being held in detention because they need
shelter care, foster parents, or treatment in a mental hospital? Until the
number of detained children who need this care is known and communi-
cated to the public, there is little hope that the necessary facilities will be
established.
The variation in detention practices between the police, the intake
worker, and the judge shows an indifference to the plight of juveniles.
It does not seem impossible for these departments of the judicial system
to coordinate their work. Nor does it seem unreasonable to expect more
judges to exercise the legal control that they have over detention. Some
of them already do so.
The courts, of course, are to some extent limited by the facilities
available to them. Public complaints about all the criminal acts com-
mitted by juveniles also puts pressure on judges to detain alleged delin-
quents. It is probably true that large numbers of juveniles who are
alleged to have committed delinquent offenses, in fact, have done so. It
is also true that the community feels that more attention should be paid
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to protecting its rights and safety. It is doubtful, however, that present
detention practices protect the community.
Indifference on the part of the public, the legislatures, the police and
the juvenile court has created detention procedures and practices in many
communities which do not protect the rights of the public or the juvenile
and which also fail to meet the needs of neglected and dependent children.
This state of affairs will continue until indifference is replaced by con-
cerned supporters, creative solutions, and the funds to carry them out.
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APPENDIX A
Rates of Detention in Selected Jurisdictions (1968)
Percent of all Percent of all
Apprehended Juveniles Court Referrals
Localitya Detainedb Detained
A 11.0 Not Available
B 14.4 Not Available
C 18.0 Not Available
D 18.0 55.3
E 22.0 39.7
F 29.0 47.9
G 32.3 59.8
H 33.0 Not Available
I Not Available 74.0
a See note 14 supra. In Trumbull County, Ohio, and Tarrant County, Texas, 1967
statistics were used because they were currently available. Because most of these cities were
designated as not for general distribution, we have not identified the specific jurisdictions
listed in the table.
b NCCD defines rate of detention as follows: "The rate of detaining is the total number
of children detained for delinquency divided by the total number apprehended and booked
for delinquent acts." Juvenile Detention, supra note 1, at 31 (1967). To the best of our
knowledge this definition was followed by the communities shown in Table I. NCCD
considers the apprehension base more useful than the court referral base. Id.
APPENDIX B
Percentage of Detention by Off ensca
Offenses A B C D E F G H I J K
Against
Persons 24.9 8.8 17.6 8.1 N/A 5.2 1.6 1.0 3.0 6.1 3.0
Against
Property 45.5 19.1 31.1 20.0 N/A 22.3 15.1 24.0 36.7 32.9 32.0
Conductb 9.9 15.0 6.9 N/A N/A N/A 8.2 8.1 9.5 12.2 15.0
Statuse 16.5 32.3 23.0 64.2 21.8 54.3 68-5 65.2 325 38.6 45.0
Traffic N/A 0.4 0.8 N/A N/A N/A N/A 1.0 1.7 1.4 3.0
All others 33 24.4 20.7 7.6 N/A 18.2 6.6 0.8 16.6 8.8 2.0
a The data were obtained in the same manner as the data for App. A. See note 14 supra.
For App. B usable data were obtained from Baltimore, Chicago, District of Columbia, Los
Angeles, New York City, and Seattle; statistics were also obtained from Marion County
(Oregon), Sangamon County (Illinois), Tarrant County (Texas), Trumbull County (Ohio),
and Volusia County (Florida).
b Some localities differentiate the category "conduct offenses" as not fitting within the
crimes against persons or property categories. Examples of such conduct offenses include
drunk and disorderly, escapee, disturbing the peace and mischief, among others.
e Status offenses are those classified as delinquencies only if committed by juveniles,
and include truancy, running away, and ungovernableness.
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APPENDIX C
Percentage of Detained Children Charged With Dangerous Offenses
Locality Percent of All Detainees
Column Ia Column IIb
C 25.2% 413%
D 18.6% 32.7%
F 6.7% 15.2%
G 1.6% 5.8%
H 1.2% 9.8%
a Homicide, aggravated assault, rape and other sex offenses, robbery, arson, and possession
of dangerous weapons are defined as dangerous offenses in Column I.
b All of the above, plus burglary, are considered dangerous offenses in Column II.
APPENDIX D
Length of Stay in Detention
Under 2 Weeks to Over 2
Location 2 Weeks a Month 1-2 Months Months
Affluent County.a 70.9% 14.5% 9.9% 4.7%
State of Massb 57.3% 24.8% 12.8% 5.1%
Trumbull County, Ohioe 96.6% 3.4% -0- -0-
District of Columbiad 32.9% 20.6% 16.2% 30.3%
Sangamon County, Ill.0 94.9% 4.4% 0.7% -0-
a The percentages for Affluent County are based on our field study. We selected random
samples of juveniles handled formally and informally by Affluent County Juvenile Court
during 1968 and the first five months of 1969. The samples consisted of 166 informal cases,
and 126 formals. Of these 292 juveniles, 55 were detained, 19 of the informals and 36 of
the formals.
b Massachusetts Study, supra note 74, pt. III, at 31-34.
e Trumbull County Study, supra note 50, pt. II, at 5.
d District of Columbia Receiving Home, Weekly Master Population Sheet 1 (Sept. 28,
1969).
e U.S. Children's Bureau, A Study of Services for Delinquent Children in Sangamon
County, Illinois, pt. II, at 14 (1967). Sangamon County includes the city of Springfield, and
had a population at the time of the study of 150,000.
APPENDIX E
Period of Detention in District of Columbia
No. of Children % of All Detained
More than 2 weeks 157 67.1%
More than 6 weeks 83 35.4%
More than 10 weeks 59 25.2%
More than 14 weeks 39 16.7%
More than 18 weeks 18 7.7%
More than 20 weeks 12 5.1%
Time Detained
